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Abstract 
According to disposition effect theory, people hold losing investments too long. However, 
many investors eventually sell at a loss, and little is known about which psychological factors 
contribute to these capitulation decisions. This study integrates prospect theory, utility 
maximization theory, and theory on reference point adaptation to argue that the combination 
of a negative expectation about an investment’s future performance and a low level of 
adaptation to previous losses leads to a greater capitulation probability. The test of this 
hypothesis in a dynamic experimental setting reveals that a larger total loss and longer time 
spent in a losing position lead to downward adaptations of the reference point. Negative 
expectations about future investment performance lead to a greater capitulation probability. 
Consistent with the theoretical framework, empirical evidence supports the relevance of the 
interaction between adaptation and expectation as a determinant of capitulation decisions.  
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One of the most intriguing phenomena related to decision making under uncertainty, 
particularly in financial markets, is the disposition effect. Shefrin and Statman (1985) propose 
that  investors  tend  to  hold  their  losing  investments  too  long  and  sell  their  winning 
investments too early. This claim received empirical support in a laboratory setting (Weber & 
Camerer,  1998),  an  online  setting  (Lee,  Park,  Lee,  &  Wyer,  2008),  in  the  stock  market 
(Odean,  1998),  and  in  property  markets  (Genesove  &  Mayer,  2001).  The  widespread 
attention to the disposition effect reflects its potentially harmful effect on current and future 
wealth through suboptimal financial decision making. A timely sale of losing investments can 
substantially improve a household’s financial position (Dhar & Zhu, 2006; Odean, 1998). 
Therefore, it is important to answer the key remaining question: Why do many investors 
eventually capitulate to their losing investment? Current theory only provides insight into 
why investors hold on to losers too long. Current theory does not explain why investors 
eventually do sell losers. Next to theoretical relevance, our study has societal implications. 
Determining the factors that stimulate or impede a timely capitulation is important from a 
welfare perspective and may be useful for financial advisory work and the enhancement of 
financial literacy.  
Empirical  results  reported  by  Lee  et  al.  (2008)  attribute  the  disposition  effect  to 
differences in the values that investors attach to possible gains and losses, rather than to any 
differences in their perceived likelihood of occurrence. This reasoning is also reflected in 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory claims that investors do not 
perceive a gain or a loss in absolute terms. Instead, investors measure the perceived value of 
each outcome according to its distance from the investor’s reference point. Any value above 
(below)  that  reference  point  is  perceived  as  a  gain  (loss)  by  the  investor.  However, 
asymmetry in the value function causes losses to exert approximately twice the psychological 
effect of equally sized gains.   4 
 
 
 
Although  prospect  theory  attempts  to  explain  investors’  overall  tendency  to  sell 
winning investments too soon and hold losing investments too long, it cannot explain how 
investors eventually reach their capitulation decisions. Prospect theory usually assumes the 
reference point is static and equal to the initial value of the investment. Yet investors might 
engage in reference point adaptations, adjusting their reference point in the direction of a 
prior outcome: upward for gains and downward for losses (Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, & Lim, 
2008). In the domain of losses, which is the topic of interest for this study, a downward 
adjustment of the reference point implies a smaller perceived loss. Arkes et al. (2008) do not 
study the antecedents of reference point adaptation, but we argue that both the size of the loss 
and the time spent in a losing position might affect the extent of this adaptation.  
For this study, we therefore combine reference point adaptation with prospect theory 
and the expected utility model to pose an explanation of why many investors eventually 
capitulate to their losing investments. Standard expected utility theory implies that investors’ 
expected  utility  of  an  outcome  is  a  function  of  (1)  their  subjective  expectation  of  the 
(objective) future value changes of the investment, and (2) the subjective values they attach 
to the objective value changes (Lee et al., 2008). Although the expected utility of an outcome 
clearly depends on many factors, studies of the disposition effect generally focus on these 
two (e.g., Lee et al. 2008). Because the investor’s objective in the expected utility model is 
determined by the  interaction of his  or her  subjective expectations  and subjective values 
attached to the possible outcomes, we hypothesize that their interaction also affects decisions 
to  hold  or  sell  a  losing  investment.  Investors  with  negative  expectations  about  the 
investment’s future performance should be more likely to capitulate to a losing investment if 
they have adapted less to previous losses. With this hypothesis, we depart from prior research 
by Weber and Camerer (1998), who assume that investors hold on to losers if they have 
barely adapted. In addition to developing and testing our alternative hypotheses, we apply the 
expected  utility  model  with  reference  point  adaptation  in  a  dynamic  rather  than  a  static 5 
 
 
 
setting. Therefore, unlike prior research, we test how dynamically changing expectations and 
reference point adaptation levels affect financial decision-making.  
Accordingly,  our  empirical  analysis  relies  on  this  conceptual  framework  and  the 
results of two recently published empirical papers. Lee et al. (2008) show that the disposition 
effect is mostly due to the different subjective values that investors attach to gains and losses. 
However, they compare subjective values in the gain and loss domains  only in a single-
decision setting. Arkes et al. (2008) also show that an investor’s reference point shifts after a 
change in the value of an investment. By focusing on a single value change, these authors do 
not  link  the adaptation of reference point levels  directly  to  financial  decision-making.  In 
contrast,  we  conduct  a  dynamic  experiment  to  determine  how  reference  point  adaptation 
occurs in a dynamic setting with multiple decision moments, as well as how it influences the 
decision to hold or sell losing investments. Our experiment thus provides insight into the 
antecedents of reference point adaptation. Furthermore, by allowing for multiple decision 
moments, we can observe the variation in expectations and reference point adaptations over 
time, which we exploit in turn to study their interaction. Our combination of adaptation-level 
theory and  the expected utility model  provides insight  into why investors eventually sell 
losing  investments.  Our  experimental  approach  also  approximates  real-life  investment 
decision-making better than static experimental procedures. In reality, investors operate in a 
dynamic,  multiperiod  setting.  Therefore,  the  experimental  framework  we  use  to  study 
multiple consecutive investor decisions offers better external validity.  
Theoretical Framework 
The expected utility model predicts that the expected utility of each possible outcome 
affects  choice  behavior.  For  example,  if  the  expected  utility  of  holding  on  to  a  losing 
investment  is  low,  we should  observe  fewer investors  holding on to  a losing stock.  The 
expected utility of an outcome is the product of (1) its subjective probability of occurrence 
and (2) its subjectively perceived value. Thus, both a higher perceived likelihood of negative 6 
 
 
 
outcomes and lower subjective values attached to those outcomes produce lower expected 
utilities, which in turn lead to higher capitulation probabilities.  
Lee et al. (2008) suggest that subjective probabilities and values have interactive effects 
on investors’ decisions, though without formally testing this prediction. We provide a test of 
these  interaction  effects  and  study  their  impact  on  the  decision  to  capitulate  to  a  losing 
investment.  Accordingly,  we  discuss  the  notions  of  expectations  and  probabilities,  the 
concept of subjective value as determined by adaptation levels, and our hypothesis regarding 
how  the  interaction  between  probabilities  and  perceived  values  might  be  linked  to  the 
capitulation decision.  
Expectation and Capitulation 
According to the expected utility framework, decision makers determine the value of 
an outcome by multiplying its subjective probabilities and their subjectively perceived values. 
Probabilities thus have linear effects. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) instead 
suggests  nonlinear  influences,  such  that  people  overweight  low  probability  events  and 
underweight medium and high probability events. We adopt a standard finance perspective: It 
is rational for an investor to sell a losing investment only if he or she does not expect its price 
to increase sufficiently to offset its risk. We do not demand a clear choice between linear 
versus  nonlinear  probability  weighting  functions,  because  we  are  only  interested  in  the 
interaction  between  the  subjective  value  and  subjective  expectation.  Therefore,  in  our 
experimental  setting,  participants  formulate  subjective  expectations  of  whether  the 
investment will increase or decrease. This requires less cognitive effort than formulating a 
subjective probability (and weighting) of each individual possible outcome (Lee et al., 2008). 
The expectation of the direction of future performance may be the only cognitive statement 
the decision maker can formulate, or it may be a summary statement of a more fine-grained 
set of beliefs. Either way, we expect this expectation to affect the investor’s decision to sell a 
losing  investment,  either  due  to  changes  in  perceived  probabilities  or  to  changes  in 7 
 
 
 
probability  weights.  In  particular,  negative  expectations  about  future  price  development 
should lead to a greater tendency to capitulate. 
Lee  et  al.  (2008)  test  the  relation  between  past  performance  and  expected  future 
performance. They find that on average, people believe that the future price of a current loser 
is more likely to increase, whereas the price of a currently held winner is more likely to 
decrease. Our approach differs from Lee et al.’s (2008) in two main ways. First, we focus on 
the effect of subjective beliefs about the likelihood of future price increases or decreases on 
actual  financial  decision-making,  not  the  link  between  past  performance  and  future 
expectations. Second, we concentrate solely on the loss domain, which provides a clearer, 
more direct view of the capitulation phenomenon.  
Investors may have positive expectations of stocks that previously incurred losses, 
especially if they think the losing stock has bottomed out and will regain some of its losses in 
future investment periods (Andreassen, 1988). This negative recency effect (i.e., tendency to 
predict the opposite of the last event) is known as the gambler’s fallacy (Ayton & Fischer, 
2004). In contrast, when investors adopt the hot hand fallacy, they expect a positive recency 
effect and the recurrence of an event (Ayton & Fischer, 2004). Concretely, they develop 
negative expectations about future performance after a loss. Both phenomena appear in actual 
investment strategies, referred to as momentum (positive recency) and contrarian (negative 
recency)  strategies,  respectively  (Morrin,  Jacoby,  Johar,  He,  Kuss,  &  Mazursky,  2002). 
Therefore, we do not  predict that either  of these two  single  fallacies is  dominant  in  our 
framework. Rather, we only infer that subjective negative expectations should relate to a 
greater probability to capitulate. 
Prospect Theory and Reference Point Adaptation 
Prospect theory postulates that investors evaluate outcomes according to a reference 
point. If the outcome is above (below) this point, it represents a gain (loss) (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Moreover, investors experience loss aversion, in that the concavity of the 8 
 
 
 
value function above the reference point and its convexity below this point (see Figure 1) 
causes investors to be risk averse in the gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain. 
Although selling a losing investment can prevent additional losses, actually realizing the loss 
has more value only if the perceived probability of incurring additional losses is very high. 
Consider  for  example  an  investment  that  has  dropped  from  its  initial  neutral  value,  as 
represented by the reference point R0 in Figure 1, to the low value L1. The perceived value 
of the investment now equals V1. A subsequent drop in the price of the asset to L2 implies a 
smaller change in perceived value compared with the first drop, because of the convexity of 
the value function in the loss domain (Weber & Camerer, 1998). Conversely, an increase 
from L1 implies a comparatively larger difference in perceived value. Therefore, investors 
tend to favor the risky option (holding on to the losing investment and incurring only a ―paper 
loss‖) over the safe option (realizing the loss and avoiding further pain).   
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Determining the appropriate reference point is a fundamental issue. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) suggest it might be the status quo or the expectation or aspiration level. It is 
unclear though where the reference point actually lies. In financial decision-making, there is 
no consensus about which price determines the reference point: the initial purchase price 
(Odean, 1998; Weber & Camerer, 1998), the historical peak of a stock price (Gneezy, 2005), 
or the expected value of future outcomes (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006; Yogo, 2008).  
This controversy is further complicated if we consider that the reference point may be 
dynamic. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that the current level of perceived wealth 
depends on a person’s adaptation to past and present stimuli, just as the adaptation level is 
affected by prior stimuli (Helson, 1964). Reference point adaptation, also referred to as a shift 
of the reference point or an updated reference point, implies that in a dynamic setting, the 
reference point adapts upward (downward) as gains (losses) accumulate. Subsequent prices 
then get evaluated relative to the adapted reference point. The adaptation process also may be 9 
 
 
 
asymmetric, such that people adapt more to gains than to losses of the same magnitude (see 
Arkes et al., 2008; Chen & Rao, 2002).  
Although adaptation to economic gains and losses is demonstrated by prior literature, 
the extent of adaptation over time has not been analyzed. Adaptation-level theory suggests 
that the perceived magnitude of a stimulus depends on its relation to an adapted level or 
reference point, determined by preceding stimuli. According to Helson’s (1964) formula, the 
reference point (  ) is the average of past stimuli levels,  
                    
    ,          (1) 
where  Xt  represents  the  current  stimulus  level,  and  t  represents  time.  It  is  unlikely  that 
investors adapt to losses exactly as suggested in Equation (1) though, and Helson’s theory has 
been criticized on several grounds. Sarris (1967) argues that extreme stimuli do not affect the 
adaptation level as much as Helson (1964) claims, and Parducci (1968) suggests that the 
effect of a stimulus is influenced by the rank of the stimulus in a group of other stimuli. 
Moreover, Equation (1) cannot differentiate how a loss experienced, say two years ago, and a 
recent one, experienced two days ago, affect adaptation levels differently. To account for this 
temporal component, Hardie, Johnson, and Fader (1993) propose modeling the adaptation 
level as 
                             ,         (2) 
for a scalar           . Although the parameter   grants recent stimuli more weight than 
past stimuli, it still cannot provide for a full separation of time and stimuli levels.  
To  achieve  more  flexibility  in  capturing  reference  point  adaptation,  we  propose 
examining the unique effects of time and past stimuli on the adaptation level separately. 
Equation (1) implies that the adapted reference point emerges as a recursive average of all 
preceding stimuli. Therefore, in a loss domain, we expect the adapted reference point to relate 
positively to the sum of all previous losses (i.e., size of total loss), but negatively to the 
number of time points elapsed. The sum of past stimuli in our setting thus collapses to the 10 
 
 
 
size of the total loss since t = 0, or          . As the stock price continues to decline, the total 
loss  increases,  and  we  expect  the  adapted  reference  point  to  decrease.  A  lower  adapted 
reference  point  actually  indicates  a  greater  extent  of  reference  point  adaptation  if  the 
investment is in a losing position. We do not expect the adaptation process to follow the 
precise dynamics of Equation (1), but we anticipate a significant relationship of both the total 
sum  of  past  stimuli  and  the  elapsed  time  to  the  final  adapted  reference  point.  We  thus 
hypothesize that in a loss domain: 
H1a: A larger total loss leads to a lower adapted reference point      and a higher 
adaptation level                .  
H1b: A longer time spent in a losing position leads a lower adapted reference point 
     and a higher adaptation level                .  
We model the effect of total loss and time on the adaptation level as 
                                                                ,     (3) 
where ALt denotes the adapted reference point,    is the current price of an investment, t is 
time in a losing position, and      is the size of the total loss. Because it takes time for a loss 
to accumulate, there must be some correlation between time spent in a losing position and 
size of total loss; therefore, we also include an interaction term. As seen in hypotheses H1a 
and H1b, we define the ―adaptation level‖ as the extent to which one has adapted to prior 
losses. The adaptation level has a negative relation to the adapted reference point and also 
directly relates to the current price level   . In our experimental design, the current definition 
of the adaptation level is important because different subjects are exposed to different price 
shocks at different stages of the experiment. The inclusion of the current price level in the 
measure for the adaptation level corrects for this. For example, consider subjects A and B 
who both start at a price         , but are hit by different losses and end up at   
       and 
  
      , respectively. If both subjects have an adapted reference point level of   
      
   
  , it is clear that subject A has fully adapted, whereas subject B has not. This corresponds 11 
 
 
 
with the value of the adaptation level, which is 0 for subject A and –30 for subject B. Full 
adaptation is achieved if the adaptation level is 0.  
We integrate our use of adaptation-level theory with prospect theory in a dynamic 
context.  When  an  investor  experiences  a  loss,  the  reference  point  in  the  prospect  theory 
framework adapts downward, which influences his or her subsequent capitulation decisions. 
The  use  of  adaptation  theory  is  thus  indispensible  for  a  realistic  understanding  of  the 
capitulation decision in a dynamic investment experiment. 
Value Function for Multistage Decisions 
According to the S-shaped value function from prospect theory, if the reference price 
equals the current price (full adaptation), no disposition effect occurs (Dhar & Zhu, 2006; 
Weber & Camerer, 1998). In the absence of adaptation though, the S-shaped value function 
implies a maximum disposition effect (Weber & Camerer, 1998). The convexity of the value 
function in the loss domain implies that further losses have a smaller impact on value if the 
reference point does not change (see Figure 1). The comparison of the extremes of full versus 
no adaptation implies that more adaptation leads to a relatively smaller tendency to hold on to 
losing investments. Thus, more adaptation should partly offset the disposition effect. Holding 
expectations constant, investors who have adapted more to their losses should be more likely 
to capitulate.  
This proposition differs from Weber and Camerer’s (1998) claims. We argue that in a 
dynamic setting, an alternative value function is more applicable than the original S-shaped 
value function from prospect theory. Thaler and Johnson (1990) consider the S-shaped value 
function useful for describing risk aversion in a gain domain and loss aversion in a loss 
domain for one-stage decisions without prior outcomes. Examples of such decisions include 
decisions about which university to attend or which particular house to buy. However, other 
decisions  involve  repeated  choices,  which  requires  a  dynamic,  multistage  perspective. 
Examples include consumers who decide, for example, whether to repurchase a product, or 12 
 
 
 
investors  who  decide  whether  to  hold  or  to  sell  investments  at  different  points  in  time. 
Previous literature provides many examples of how prior outcomes and sunk costs affect 
subsequent investment decisions (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Laughhunn & Payne, 1984). 
However, Weber and Camerer (1998) assume that prior gains or losses do not influence 
subsequent decisions, beyond the magnitude effects that occur for larger single-stage gains or 
losses. For example, after incurring a $30 loss, an additional $10 loss has the same negative 
utility as a $40 single-stage loss (Weber & Camerer, 1998). Our experimental design allows 
for an ongoing effect of prior losses on subsequent decisions. 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) report empirical evidence that prior gains induce risk-
seeking behavior in subsequent choices and thus propose a quasi-hedonic editing rule: in a 
two-stage gamble with a prior loss, a subsequent loss is not automatically integrated with the 
initial loss. Their findings suggest people may be risk averse if they have experienced a prior 
loss, such that the value function in a loss domain may contain a concave region, in addition 
to a convex region. Several other studies confirm that the value function in the loss domain is 
not  always  convex  but  rather  is  convexo-concave  for  increasing  absolute  loss  sizes. 
Markowitz (1952) was the first to propose a utility function with convex and concave regions 
in both the gain and loss domains. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have been cited mainly for 
their S-shaped value function, but they also consider special circumstances and alternative 
specifications.  For example, they suggest  that because large losses  often lead to  lifestyle 
changes, concave regions are likely in the value function for losses. Using horse race betting 
data, Jullien and Salanié (2000) find that bettors appear risk averse for large losses.  
Moreover, several experimental studies reveal evidence of concave utility functions 
for losses when respondents must choose among options with different risk levels, such as a 
lottery  choice  between  a  low  payoff/low-risk  versus  a  large  payoff/high-risk  profile 
(Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L'Haridon, 2008; Laughhunn, Payne, & Crum, 1980; Laury & 
Holt, 2008; Loehman, 1998; Sullivan & Kida, 1995; Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997). Outside 13 
 
 
 
the laboratory setting, analyses based on health insurance plans further suggest the utility 
function  for  losses  is  convex  at  first  but  becomes  concave  for  large  losses  (Marquis  & 
Holmer, 1996). Using this evidence, De Giorgi, Hens, and Post (2005) propose a formal 
modification of the S-shaped value function, namely, a piecewise exponential value function, 
which contains a concave region of the value function in the loss domain. Finally, explicitly 
allowing  for  different  behaviors  in  the  value  function  for  small  versus  larger  losses  is 
particularly important in our case, because we study dynamic capitulation decisions when 
losses accumulate over time. Despite the growing evidence of a concave region in the value 
function for large losses, prior studies consider only stand-alone decisions that do not relate 
dynamically, unlike the multistage decision setting we employ here.  
In Figure 1, we illustrate the value function that we use in our theoretical framework 
for investors who do not adapt to losses. The function is based on the piecewise exponential 
value function (De Giorgi et al., 2005) and is consistent with the quasi-hedonic editing rule 
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Close to the reference point R0, the value function is kinked and 
convexo-concave in the realized value, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). But 
for large losses, the piecewise exponential value function is concave in the loss domain and 
discourages extreme risk taking. For example, consider a stock price decline from its initial 
price R0 to L1 at time 1, and then a further decline to L2 at time 2. According to this value 
function with a second kink in the loss domain, the perceived value would be V3 rather than 
V2. 
Reference Point Adaptation and the Capitulation Decision 
We expect investors who have adapted to prior losses to be less likely to sell losing 
investments. Consider the example in Figure 2, in which we illustrate the reference points of 
both investors in a horizontal manner. Investor A and investor B both start investing in a 
stock at   . They buy the stock at the same initial price of $100, which we assume is equal to 
their  initial  reference  point.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  we  also  assume  that  the  value 14 
 
 
 
functions of investors A and B are exactly the same. However, the extent to which each 
investor adapts to gains or losses differs. At   , the stock price drops from $100 to $50, after 
which investor A’s reference point (  ) decreases to $90, whereas that of investor B (  ) 
shifts to $70. Thus, investor B adapts more to the loss than investor A. We further assume 
that the stock price at    is equally likely to drop further to $40 or bounce back to $60.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
For simplicity, we assume that the shape of the value function remains the same and 
only its horizontal position changes. As Figure 2 shows, the less adapted investor A is in the 
concavo-convex area of the value function, whereas investor B is clearly in the convex region 
for the two possible outcomes. Investor A thus is more likely to sell the asset, but investor B 
is more likely to hold it. If both investors predict negative future performance, the effect gets 
reinforced, such that investor A’s expected value function decreases much faster than that of 
investor B, due to the concavity for large losses. We then would expect more pronounced 
differences in capitulation decisions between less adapted and more adapted investors who 
hold  similar  negative  views  on  the  stock’s  future  performance.  This  interaction  between 
adaptation and expectation represents an innovative feature in our model. We summarize our 
complete dynamic model of an investor’s financial decision-making in Figure 3, with the 
following expectations: 
H2: A negative expectation about an investment's future performance combined with 
a low adaptation level                 leads to a larger capitulation probability. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Methodology 
Participants and Procedure 
Respondents  considered  a  single  stock,  about  which  they  had  to  make  multiple 
decisions to hold or sell. The amounts and timing of losses varied across respondents. In our 
experiment, 111 students at a Dutch university (72 male, 39 female) participated, with a 15 
 
 
 
chance to win a €100 prize by enrolling in a lottery. Better performance in the investment 
experiment resulted in a higher probability of winning the prize.  
Participants  arrived  at  the  lab  and  were  assigned  to  individual  cubicles.  They 
reviewed a scenario in which they recently started investing in a single stock, stock X. The 
amount invested in stock X was predetermined and equal for every participant. We specified 
up  to  10  investment  periods  for  the  experiment.  After  each  period,  participants  received 
information on the stock’s performance and were asked whether they wanted to hold or sell 
the stock. They could only choose to sell or hold the entire invested amount. Before each 
decision, respondents answered a short questionnaire that elicited their expectation of the 
stock’s future performance and their reference point adaptation level.  
Previous  studies  of  the  disposition  effect  have  employed  a  limited  number  of 
predetermined price patterns (Lee et al., 2008; Weber & Camerer, 1998). To increase the 
generalizability of our  findings  though, we  generated a wide range of  intermediate price 
dynamics over the ten investment periods. All participants incurred losses in their investment, 
but to make the price patterns realistic and avoid long runs of losses, we included some mild 
upward movements in the intermediate stages. To avoid overly frequent upward movements, 
we divided the (up to) ten investment periods into three unequally sized blocks. Participants 
were randomly assigned a first loss of 5%, 10%, 20%, or 40%, roughly evenly spread out 
over the initial 1, 3, or 5 periods in block 1. Then in block 2, prices stayed relatively stable 
(upward or downward stock price movements of around 1%) for either 2 or 4 periods. A 
second major loss of 5%, 10%, or 15% took place in block 3 within 1 period. Then the 
experiment ended. Therefore, participants considered various combinations of price patterns, 
based on randomly assigned sizes and durations of losses (see Table 1). A visualization of the 
different price paths is given in Figure 4. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 16 
 
 
 
Investment Goals as Measures of Adaptation  
Several measures of adaptation levels have been proposed in previous studies. For 
example, Baucells, Weber, and Welfens (2007) ask subjects to report the selling price at 
which  they  would  feel  ―neither  happy  nor  unhappy.‖  However,  these  participants  must 
understand the concept of indifference and be able to express that psychological state in terms 
of stock prices. Another limitation of former studies (Baucells et al., 2007; Chen & Rao, 
2002) stems from their presentation of a series of outcomes, after which participants report 
their reference point. This type of retrospective evaluation can be highly biased (Freedman, 
Thorton,  Camburn,  Alwin,  &  Young-DeMarco,  1988).  Moreover,  this  methodological 
approach does not allow researchers to observe how reference points change over the course 
of the study.  
Arkes et al. (2008) instead ask participants to report how much an investment must 
appreciate (depreciate) further to make them feel as happy (sad) as they were when they 
learned about a previous gain (loss). However, people may have difficulty imagining how 
they would feel about future gains and losses, and comparing these imagined feelings with 
recollections of recently experienced feelings. Affective forecasting studies demonstrate that 
people’s predictions of their own hedonic reactions to future events are susceptible to errors 
and biases  (Wilson  &  Gilbert,  2005). Although  people often predict the valence of their 
emotional reaction (good vs. bad) or even specific emotions (e.g. joy, sadness) correctly, they 
also overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions. Wilson and Gilbert 
(2005) suggest that in the case of negative events, people underestimate how quickly they 
will cope with the pain or loss. 
If the prospect value function in Figures 1 and 2 is constant over time, it does not 
matter which measure of reference prices we use. Most reference points generally refer to 
current wealth, though aspiration levels also can serve as anchoring values (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) further argue that goals can serve as reference 17 
 
 
 
points, such that outcomes have a smaller marginal impact when they are more distant from a 
postulated  goal,  and  failing  to  reach  the  goal  is  more  psychologically  harmful  than 
overshooting it (i.e., loss aversion). Their findings also suggest that goals influence people’s 
performance, effort, and persistence in non-risky situations, as well as their choices in risky 
settings. When presented with a single decision task, people are more risk seeking when they 
have not attained their goal, consistent with the S-shaped value function in prospect theory. 
Therefore, we use investors’ goals as an indicator of an adapted reference point. This choice 
receives support from the psychological notion that goals energize and direct human behavior 
(Austin  &  Vancouver,  1996;  Elliott  &  Dweck,  1988).  Moreover,  previous  management 
studies show that the aspiration level is adaptive and affected by performance feedback (Lant, 
1992; Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 2002). Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, and Carver (2006) also 
find that goals serve as reference values for feedback. If a goal is perceived as unattainable, 
people disengage from this goal and then reengage with new goals which benefit their well-
being (Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & Brun de Pontet, 2007). Accordingly, we consider goals an 
appropriate measure of reference point adaptations in our setting.  
Specifically, when investors adapt their reference points, the adaptation is reflected in 
their goals. To measure investors’ goals, we asked the participants,  after each new price 
realization, to report at what price level they would feel satisfied and at what price level they 
would be willing to sell their invested security. We use these selling prices as measures of 
reference point adaptation, similar to Arkes et al. (2008), though we do not adopt their use of 
the BDM procedure (Becker, DeGroot,  & Marschak, 1964). The BDM procedure, which 
specifies two future prices with equal probabilities, cannot distinguish the reference point 
from the selling decision. That is, participants in a BDM study indicate a minimum selling 
price prior to the random selection of one of the two future prices. They must sell at the 
random  price  if  it  equals  or  is  higher  than  their  minimum  selling  price.  Therefore,  the 
decision  is  inherently  determined  by  the  minimum  selling  price.  In  our  experiment, 18 
 
 
 
investment goals did not lead to any hold/sell obligation; rather, participants could hold or 
capitulate,  regardless  of  their  previously  postulated  investment  goals.  Our  measure  of 
reference  point  adaptation  also  is  more  intuitive  and  requires  less  cognitive  effort  than 
measures used in previous studies (e.g., Baucells et al., 2007), so participants can manage to 
provide answers about their adapted reference points for multiple points in time. 
However,  our  calculation  of  the  adapted  reference  point  requires  some  additional 
discussion. We use the investment goal measures to estimate the adapted reference points, as 
in Arkes et al. (2008). If the adapted reference point at time    is    and the satisfactory price 
is   , the difference between    and    should be the same as the difference between    and 
   at   , with the assumption that the shape of the prospect theory value function remains 
unchanged:  
                                               . (4) 
If one participant reports a satisfactory price of $37 at    and $35 at   , the adapted reference 
point has adjusted $2 downward. Although neither the satisfactory price nor the selling price 
is the reference point per se, by holding the prospect theory value function constant, we can 
determine  any  reference  point  adaptation  over  time  according  to  the  adaptations  in  the 
satisfactory price and selling price over time. By tracking the differences in the satisfactory 
and selling prices over the course of the experiment, we also capture the movement of the 
adapted reference point. The adaptation level is then defined by the difference between the 
current price the computed reference point,              . 
  Investors who set high investment goals also may have a more optimistic expectation 
of  the  investment’s  performance,  which  would  imply  a  positive  correlation  between  the 
reference point and expected performance. Nonetheless Heath et al. (1999) find that the effect 
of  goals  on  persistence,  effort,  and  task  performance  is  independent  of  expectations  or 
likelihood. To account for any potential correlation between expectation and goal, in our 
analysis we made use of partial least squares regression, which supposes that all the variables 19 
 
 
 
in the model are correlated. Thus any possible statistical correlation between goals (adapted 
reference point) and expectation is controlled for in our analysis.  
Questionnaire 
We borrowed four measures from Arkes et al. (2008) and Ayton and Fischer (2004). 
For the investment goal, we use two items, pertaining to the satisfactory price of investors—
―In the next period, what is the price of stock X that would make you feel satisfied?‖ (M= 
$32.75, SD = $5.35)—and estimates of the selling price—―In the next period, if the stock 
price increases, what is the price you would sell at?‖ (M = $35.64, SD = $6.26). The initial 
price of the stock was $33.61. We also measure expectations of the rational system by asking, 
―How do you think the price of stock X will change in the next period?‖ The responses used a 
nine-point scale (1 = ―surely decrease,‖ 9 = ―surely increase,‖ M = 5.68, SD = 1.66). We only 
asked participants to report their subjective expectation for the near future (next period). We 
did not administer measures of their expectations about the more distant future. Therefore, 
our expectation measure is myopic and could prompt myopic decision-making. Finally, we 
measure whether participants chose to hold on to or capitulate their losing investment by 
asking: ―Do you want to hold or sell stock X now?‖  
We also administered several control questions to assess individual differences related 
to age, gender, risk aversion, motivation to perform well, perception of the riskiness of the 
stock,  and  investment  experience  in  any  kind  of  financial  products  and  in  equity.  Risk 
aversion was measured through asset allocation tasks. Participants’ motivation to perform 
well and their perception of the riskiness of the stock were measured on nine-point scales on 
which larger numbers indicated higher motivation and risk perceptions.  
We  prefer  to  test  all  hypothesized  relations  simultaneously,  to  control  for  the 
correlation among the variables. Structural equation modeling (SEM) seems appropriate in 
this  situation,  but  covariance-based  techniques  do  not  allow  for  dichotomous  dependent 
variables, such as the hold/sell decision in our framework. We therefore apply partial least 20 
 
 
 
squares  (PLS)  regression  analysis,  which  is  a  distribution-free  technique  with  fewer 
constraints. In particular, it allows for the simultaneous testing of hypotheses, single- and 
multi-item  measurement,  the  use  of  both  reflective  and  formative  scales,  and  the  use  of 
dichotomous dependent variables. Our use of PLS thus is not related to measuring latent 
variables but rather reflects our goal to analyze the complete model at once. We tested our 
three hypotheses using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). The adapted reference 
point has two measures. The remaining variables all have one measure each, which means 
reliability and validity tests are not applicable for these single-measure variables. We pooled 
a total of 552 decisions for analysis. A limitation of PLS due to its complexity and iterative 
nature of the estimation process is that no exact statistical theory is available for inference. 
Standard errors for the PLS parameter estimates are usually computed based on the bootstrap, 
see Ringle, Wende & Will (2005). We follow this line and use a bootstrap procedure with 
500 replications to assess parameter significance.  
Results 
Preliminary Results 
Before we estimate our structural model, we present some descriptive statistics in 
Figure 5. The left-hand panel in Figure 5 plots the empirical capitulation frequencies of the 
111 participants over the (maximum) 10 stages of the experiment, disaggregated over the size 
of the loss in the first stage of the experiment. The frequencies are computed per first-stage 
loss size by dividing the number of capitulators over the period by the number of subjects that 
still participated at the start of the period. The frequencies can thus be interpreted as discrete 
time hazard rates. The figure shows that the participants with the 5% loss size only left the 
experiment early, or not at all. This is probably due to the small size of the loss, which 
remains comparable to the small up and down random price movement during the second 
stage  of  the  experiment.  The  40%  loss  subjects  show  less  systematic  behavior.  A  few 
capitulate in the first 5 periods, but most subjects participate till the end. The subjects with 21 
 
 
 
the 10% and particularly the 20% loss rates show more variation over time. The 20% loss 
subjects appear to capitulate somewhat later in the experiment, suggesting that the loss size 
influences the capitulation decision. Note, however, that these descriptive statistics do not 
control for all the other hypothesized effects. 
The right-hand panel in Figure 5 shows the capitulation frequencies disaggregated 
over the duration of the first-stage loss. The pattern there is much clearer. A number of 
individuals cannot suffer the first-stage loss and capitulate early on. Subsequently, there are 
flatter segments where most subjects remain in the experiment and do not capitulate. Finally, 
a  second  big  shock  is  administered  and  many  subjects  leave  the  experiment  directly. 
Interestingly, the subjects whose first-stage loss was spread out over 5 periods do not react as 
fiercely  as  the  other  groups  to  the  final  (third-stage)  large  loss.  We  now  turn  from  the 
descriptive statistics to the actual model estimation. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Before testing the full model, we estimated a preliminary model with time spent in a 
losing position, total price change since the initial period (such that a more negative price 
change indicated a larger total loss), and the most recent price change since the previous 
period  (such  that  a  more  negative  price  change  indicated  a  larger  recent  loss).  These 
explanatory variables refer to the expectation and probability of capitulation (see Figure 6). 
The results show that the size of the total price change relates negatively to expectations (β = 
-.196, t = 4.447, p < .001), such that participants expect a bounce back (negative recency) in 
prices  as  losses  accumulate.  However,  the  size  of  the  most  recent  price  change  relates 
positively to expectations (β = .203, t = 4.226, p < .001), so participants expect a momentum 
(positive recency) effect and positively correlated price movements in the short run. These 
results are consistent with our expectation that both positive and negative recency effects 
occur simultaneously. We also find a positive relation between the size of the total price 
change and the capitulation probability (β = .076, t = 2.387, p = .017). This finding indicates 22 
 
 
 
that a larger loss relates to a larger probability to hold on to the losing investment, consistent 
with the notion that people avoid realizing losses. As the total price change becomes more 
negative,  the  probability  to  capitulate  decreases,  and  a  negative  expectation  relates  to  a 
greater probability of capitulation. This effect is significant (β  = –.275, t = 6.808, p < .001). 
However, the size of recent losses and time spent in a losing position do not significantly 
influence the capitulation probability (β = –.036, t = 1.088, p = .277; β = .053, t = 1.128, p = 
.260), nor does time spent in a losing position affect expectations (β = –.073, t = 1.356, p = 
.176). The explanatory power of this preliminary model is limited (R
2 = .086), because we 
excluded some important interaction terms. Our complete model addresses this gap.  
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
Complete Model Results 
We provide the results for the complete model in Figure 7, which shows that the 
findings are consistent with the preliminary model, in that more negative expectations about 
the stock’s future performance predict a stronger likelihood to capitulate (β = -.230, t = 7.202, 
p < .001). Higher values for our expectations measure imply more positive expectations about 
the  investment’s  future  values.  Thus,  a  negative  effect  implies  that  people  with  lower 
expectations are more likely to sell.  
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
The  time  spent  in  a  losing  position  (measured  by  the  time  index  of  the  hold/sell 
decision, Time = 1,…,10) and the size of the total loss have a significant impact on reference 
point adaptation. Participants are more adapted if the total loss they experienced (i.e., their 
negative total price change) is larger (β = .517, t = 14.761, p < .001) and if the time spent in 
the losing position is longer (β  = .096, t = 2.554, p = .011). In our experimental setting, it 
generally takes time for losses to accumulate, so losses correlate with longer times in a losing 
position. To ensure that the effects of the size of the total price change and time are unique, 
and  to  disentangle  their  effects  on  the  adaptation  level,  we  include  an  interaction  term 23 
 
 
 
between  time  and  the  total  price  change.  This  interaction  term  significantly  affects  the 
adaptation level (β = .114, t = 2.465, p = .014). We conclude that there is strong empirical 
support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Larger total losses and a longer time spent in a losing 
position induce greater adaptation level. We find no direct effect of the adaptation level on 
capitulation (β = -.037, t = 1.034, p = .302).  
Finally, we test whether the interaction between the adaptation level and expectations 
affects the tendency to capitulate. We find a significant interaction effect (β = .543, t = 9.320, 
p < .001). We examine the interaction effect more closely by splitting the sample. On the 
nine-point measurement scale for expectations, we designate those equal to 6 or greater as 
positive expectations, and the rest  as  negative.  In Table 2, we provide the means  of the 
capitulation  probability  for  positive  versus  negative  expectations  and  high  versus  low 
adaptation level. For positive expectations, the capitulation probability is small for both high 
and low adaptation level groups. However when the expectation is negative, the capitulation 
probability is greater for the low than for the high adaptation level group, which is in line 
with the proposition as in Hypothesis 2.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Our findings in Figure 7 indicate that the effect of the total price change on the selling 
decision becomes insignificant (β = .052, t = 1.264, p = .207) when we include the adaptation 
level and its interaction term with expectation in the model. Thus, when we control for the 
extent to which subjects have adapted, the relation between the size of the total loss and the 
capitulation probability becomes irrelevant. To predict investors’ capitulation decisions, the 
actual size of the total loss is not an important factor, because investors adapt to losses. 
Instead, it is more important to know how much the investors have adapted to the loss.  
To mitigate concerns about the robustness of the results, we incorporate the individual 
characteristics of respondents as controls in our analysis for the expectation, the adaptation 
level, and the capitulate decision. The results remain robust. Investment experience has no 24 
 
 
 
direct effect on expectation, adaptation level, or capitulation. Higher risk aversion induces 
more positive expectations (β = .218, t = 4.061, p < .001). Also, if the stock is perceived as 
riskier (β = .068, t = 1.997, p = .046) or the subject reports a higher motivation to perform 
well  in  the  experiment  (β  =  .093,  t  =  2.211,  p  =  .028),  the  capitulation  probability  is 
significantly higher.  
In summary, we find (empirical) support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2. Furthermore, 
the  variance  in  the  capitulation  probability  can  be  substantially  better  explained  by  the 
complete model (R
2  = .379) than by the preliminary model  (R
2 = .086). The interaction 
between  expectation  and  adaptation  thus  offers  a  powerful  explanation  of  investors’ 
capitulation  decisions  in  a  dynamic  setting:  pessimistic  expectations  about  future  stock 
performance matter most if one has not adapted to prior losses. We confirm this claim with a 
simple exercise: dropping only the interaction term from the full model in Figure 7 reduces 
the R
2 to a meager .086 again.  
General Discussion 
We investigate how investors eventually  come  to  the decision to  sell their losing 
investments. Our conceptual model integrates prospect theory and adaptation-level theory, 
and we test that model with a laboratory experiment. Previous literature has tested subjective 
expectations  and  subjective  value  as  two  separate  determinants  of  investors’  hold/sell 
decisions.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  study  is  the  first  investigation  of  their 
interaction effect on capitulation probability. In addition, we have proposed a novel way to 
model investors’ subjective values of losses by measuring their adaptation to losses.  
  Our  study  confirms  previously  reported  empirical  findings  and  adds  to  existing 
knowledge  about  reference  point  adaptation.  In  particular,  our  finding  that  negative 
expectations lead to larger selling probabilities is consistent with standard economic theories, 
such as Lee et al.’s (2008) finding that a participant’s subjective expectation cannot explain 
the disposition effect. Our empirical results also are consistent with Arkes et al.’s (2008) 25 
 
 
 
claim that investors adapt to losses. We provide additional insight into the separate effects of 
time spent in a losing position and the size of losses, because we disentangle their unique 
influences. In line with Hardie et al. (1993), we find that the temporal component plays a 
critical role in (financial) decision-making, but we also note that the adaptation level depends 
on the time spent in a losing position. That is, it takes time for investors to adapt to a financial 
loss. Lee et al. (2008) also find that investors’ subjective values attached to gains and losses 
affect their hold/sell decisions. We extend these findings by proposing a dynamic model for 
predicting subjective value, based on investors’ expectations and adaptation to prior losses.  
The  opposite  effects  of  the  size  of  a  recent  loss  and  total  losses  on  expectations 
warrant some attention as well. When the size of total losses increases, participants report 
significantly more optimistic expectations (β = -.196, t = 4.395, p < .001), a reflection of the 
bounce-back effect, according to which participants expect a depreciated stock to appreciate 
again  in  the  future.  When  the  recent  loss  is  larger  though,  participants  report  negative 
expectations (β = .203, t = 4.214, p < .001), implying that they expect momentum in future 
stock market prices. These results simultaneously support both the gambler’s fallacy and the 
hot hand fallacy. They also highlight the importance of studying the role of time and the 
differential impact of recent and total losses on investors’ expectations and decision-making. 
Through this link, we can explain why many investors eventually capitulate to their losing 
investments. 
Furthermore, unlike Weber and Camerer (1998), we aim to determine how reference 
points adapt in a multiple-period setting and its relation to decision-making. As our main 
contribution, we bring several concepts together in a dynamic model to predict investors’ 
decisions. The concept of reference point adaptation is relatively recent (Arkes et al. 2008) 
and has not been linked clearly to investment decisions. Therefore, we exploited Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory to discuss the concept of reference point adaptation but 
also  needed  to  take  into  account  the  quasi-hedonic  editing  rule  (e.g.,  Thaler  &  Johnson, 26 
 
 
 
1990).  Prospect  theory,  the  quasi-hedonic  editing  hypothesis,  as  well  as  the  piecewise 
quadratic  utility  function  all  suggest  a  ―tipping  point‖  in  the  loss  domain,  after  which 
concavity (and thus risk aversion) sets in for large or subsequent losses. The importance of 
this  point  for  our  experimental  setting  and  empirical  model  design  is  evident.  As  losses 
accumulate over time, the values of future prospects by an individual investor depend on his 
or her level of adaptation. 
We provide key insights into reference point adaptation in a dynamic context. Over 
time, both the size of the loss and the time spent in a losing position lead to more downward 
adjustments of the reference point and increases in the level of adaptation. Moreover, we find 
that  individuals’  adaptation  level  to  prior  losses  interacts  with  expectations  to  affect 
capitulation.  If  expectations  are  negative,  ill-adapted  subjects  (i.e.,  with  lower  adaptation 
levels) have on average a higher tendency to capitulate. These findings imply a link between 
reference point adaptation and (financial) decision–making, and are particularly relevant to 
decision-making research in a multi-period or longitudinal setting. Such a dynamic setting 
closely resembles decision-making in reality, because people face repeated decisions daily. 
Our  findings  are  also  relevant  for  investment  markets  such  as  pension  funds,  which  are 
designed to be held over prolonged periods. The related buying and selling decisions are less 
frequent, and the role of time may be even more important. Our model may also apply to 
other situations that involve price changes and continuous decision-making. For example, 
Lewis (2006) attempts to explain the negative effect of promotions on brand equity using 
adaptation  theory  (Blattberg,  Briesch,  &  Fox,  1995;  Neslin,  2002),  such  that  deeply 
discounted prices lead to the formation of lower reference prices. Adaptation also might be 
relevant for nonfinancial consumer behavior elements, such as when consumers stay with 
service  providers  that  offer  declining  levels  of  service  quality.  If  the  decline  is  gradual, 
adaptation may explain inertia, together with an avoidance of switching costs (De Ruyter, 27 
 
 
 
Wetzels, & Bloemer, 1998). Further research should adjust our dynamic experiment to test 
the relevance of adaptation in such non-financial settings.  
In addition, several limitations in our study suggest further directions for research. We 
acknowledge that an investor’s adapted reference point (inferred from the investment goal) 
and expectation about the stock’s future performance may be correlated. Lant (1992) shows 
that models applied to expectation formation are useful for describing aspiration formation. 
Thus,  adaptation  to  losses  could  induce  more  negative  expectations  about  future  price 
performance. A more negative forecast about stock prices also may increase willingness to 
sell the stock at a lower price, in line with models proposed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006) and 
Yogo (2008) who define the reference point as an expectation about future outcomes. To 
estimate the expected value of the future outcome, individuals must be aware of their own 
perceived  current  state  (i.e.,  adapted  reference  point),  so  it  should  not  be  surprising  that 
investors’ expectations about the stock’s future performance relates to their adapted reference 
point.  However,  we  measured  both  variables,  instead  of  manipulating  them  in  our 
experimental setting and thus cannot conclude any causal relationship. Additional research 
should investigate these possible relations. 
  In  addition,  we  conducted  this  experiment  within  a  short  time  frame,  whereas  in 
reality, investors have more time between various decision moments. Future studies should 
try to replicate our findings using larger samples in more natural settings. Another potential 
follow-up study could test if our model also works in the domain of gains. Our participants 
were undergraduates, and many of them lacked any actual investment experience, which may 
raise questions about the generalizability of our results. However, we do not find a significant 
difference  in  the  capitulation  tendency  between  those  who  have  and  do  not  have  prior 
investment experience.  
  The dynamic methodology we used is novel; therefore, the results should be validated 
in  follow-up  experiments.  For  example,  additional  experiments  might  provide  money  to 28 
 
 
 
participants to invest prior to the start of the investment task, which would increase realism 
and force participants to invest their own money. To minimize the ―house money‖ effect, the 
prior task for which participants get paid should appear unrelated to the investment study. 
Other studies could make use of other price patterns, such as periods of insignificant price 
changes  prior  to  a  shock  of  loss.  Finally,  further  research  might  administer  additional 
measures of expectations in the long term.  
Conclusion 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) proposes that values of financial gains 
or losses are not perceived in absolute terms but rather depend on a comparison against a 
reference point. Arkes et al. (2008) find that such a reference point is not static, and people 
adapt to gains and losses. The value of a second gain or loss partly depends on the adaptation 
of  reference  points  to  the  first  gain  or  loss.  We  therefore  investigate  the  antecedents  of 
reference point adaptation and the role that it plays in the decision to capitulate to a losing 
investment. 
By using a dynamic experiment, we can conclude that a larger prior loss and a longer 
time spent in a losing position predict greater reference point adaptation. Consistent with 
standard  finance  theory,  negative  expectations  lead  to  a  stronger  tendency  to  capitulate. 
Moreover, the effect of negative expectations is stronger when investors have adapted less to 
their prior loss. Thus, in the presence of negative expectations, investors who adapted more to 
prior losses are less likely to capitulate to their losing investment, compared with those who 
have adapted little.  
We relate our finding to the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 1985) and suggest 
that the adaptation of reference points influences investors’ probability to capitulate to their 
losing investment. Our findings may also apply in other multistage decision-making settings, 
such as those related to consumers’ repurchase or switching choices for product or service 
suppliers.  29 
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Figure 1. S-shaped value functions and the disposition effect 
  
Notes: The solid line represents the S-shaped value function proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) in a one-stage setting. For larger losses in a two-stage setting, the quasi-
hedonic editing rule (Thaler & Johnson 1990) suggests a concave region (dashed line) in the 
value function of the loss domain. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between expectation and reference point adaptation 
 
Notes: Investor A and investor B both start investing in stock X at    with $100 per share. At 
  , the stock price drops from $100 to $50. Investor A’s reference point (  ) moves to $90, 
while that of investor B (  ) moves to $70. Assume at    there is an equal chance that the 
price drops further to $40 or bounces back to $60. If the stock price decreases to $40, it 
results in a more negative value for investor A than for investor B             . If the stock 
price increases to $60, it leads to a more positive value     for investor B than for investor A 
            . Using the expected value function, investor A sells the stock, but investor B 
holds it. This effect is strengthened if both investors hold similarly negative views on the 
future performance of the stock due to concavity of the value function of the non-adapted 
investor A for stock prices below the current price.   
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Figure 3. Proposed model of decision-making for a losing investment. 
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Figure 4. Four sample price patterns presented to participants in the experiment.  
  
Notes: Participants considered various combinations of price patterns, based on randomly 
assigned sizes and durations of losses (see table 1 for details) and there are some mild upward 
movements in the intermediate stages.  
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Figure 5. Descriptive statistics: empirical capitulation frequencies over time 
 
      
 
Notes: The left-hand panel shows the empirical capitulation frequencies over the 10 stages of 
the experiment, disaggregated with respect to the size of the first-stage loss. For example, for 
the 10% loss curve in period 2, we divide the number of subjects that were administrated a 
10% first-stage loss and capitulated in the second period, by the number of 10% first-stage 
loss subjects still participating at the start of period 2. The right-hand panel holds similar 
empirical capitulation frequencies, but disaggregated over the duration of the first-stage loss 
(see also Table 1).   
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
0 2 4 6 8 10
5% loss
10% loss
20% loss
40% loss
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
0 2 4 6 8 10
1 period
3 periods
5 periods39 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Results of preliminary model (no adaptation level or interaction with expectation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < .05. 
*** p < .001. 
n.s. = not significant, results based on two-tailed t-test. 
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Figure 7. Results of the complete proposed model (including adaptation level and interaction 
with expectation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < .05. 
** p < .01.  
*** p < .001.  
n.s. = not significant, results based on two-tailed t-test.  
Notes: The insignificant effects of recent price change and time on capitulation probability 
and effect of time on expectation remain insignificant in this analysis. For simplicity, we do 
not show these relations this figure.  
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Table 1. Price changes presented in the experiment. 
a. Block 1 (Start wealth level $3361)  
  First major loss 
  ≈ -5%  ≈ -10%  ≈ -20%  ≈ -40% 
Number of periods  Price change at each period (in $) 
1  -165.06  -337.38  -674.76  -1331.36 
3  -113.95 
-89.56 
38.45 
-193.24 
-178.23 
35.36 
-386.48 
-356.46 
70.72 
-834.24 
-698.46 
201.34 
5  -38.27 
-55.68 
40.36 
-61.49 
-49.98 
 -99.21 
-89.43 
40.32 
-109.31 
-78.47 
-198.42 
-178.86 
80.64 
-218.62 
-156.94 
-277.33 
-390.12 
177.45 
-314.05 
-527.31 
b. Block 2 
  Stable prices  
  ≈ 1% 
Number of periods  Price change at each period (in $) 
2  -34.78 
39.32 
4  -34.78 
39.32 
46.18 
-33.20 
c. Block 3 
  Second major loss 
  ≈ -5%  ≈ -10%  ≈ -15% 
Number of period  Price change at each period (in $) 
1  -177.23  -345.31  -512.89 
Notes: We divide the prices presented to participants into three blocks. The initial value of 
stock X starts at $3361 ($33.61  100 shares). Participants were randomly assigned to incur 
approximately a 5%, 10%, 20%, or 40% first major loss in block 1 (over 1, 3, or 5 periods). 
In block 2, participants experienced price changes of approximately 1% (2 or 4 periods). In 
block 3, participants incur a second major loss of approximately 5%, 10%, or 15% in 1 
period. The order of price presentations in blocks 1 and 2 were random.  42 
 
 
 
Table 2. Probability of capitulation with respect to expectation (high vs. low) and adaptation 
level (high vs. low)  
 
Capitulation Probability 
    Adaptation level 
    High  Low 
Expectation 
Negative  0.155  0.255 
Positive  0.037  0.036 
Notes: A median split was performed on all adaptation levels obtained in the experiment. To 
distinguish between positive and negative expectations, expectations of 6 to 9 were labeled as 
positive, and of 1 to 5 as negative expectations. The capitulation probability is small when the 
expectation is positive, regardless of the adaptation level. When the expectation is negative 
though, the capitulation probability is greater when the adaptation level is low than when it is 
high. 
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